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INTEGRATION OF REBORN POLAND AND UNITED ROMANIA. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Krzysztof Nowak

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In contrast to Romania, for which the year 1918 was the time of unification of the so-called new provinces with the “old” Kingdom (*Regat*), Poland for 123 years did not exist on the map of Europe, being part of three countries: Russia, Prussia (from 1871 Germany) and Austria (from 1867 Austro-Hungary), which in 1772, 1793 and 1795 divided Polish Kingdom (733 000 km² in 1772) in three parts. So the year 1918 meant for Poles the complete rebirth of their own state.

In 1928, 10 years after the rebirth of Poland and the unification of Romania, the Polish journalist Irena W. Kosmowska wrote in her book about Romania: *“The division into districts under various governments wasn’t similar in Poland and Romania? And then the miracle of liberation and the consolidation of districts like us in the north as there under the radiant midday sun? [...] All this proves that we should go hand in hand”* (Kosmowska 1928, 54-55). It encouraged in some way to compare the processes of rebirth and unification of both states. Thus, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Poland’s regaining its independence and the centenary of the unification of Romania, it is worth doing so, which may become an incentive for many interesting observations of further similarities and differences, whose meaning and effects often give rise to the present day. In addition, this issue is often overlooked by historians, focusing on the military and political aspects of the turn of 1918 in the history of both countries, which in the interwar period were linked by a military alliance and had a common and conflict-free border.

With regard to the political situation of World War I, of course, one can not put up a sign of equality between the conditions for conducting diplomatic activities under the existing Romanian

statehood and the conditions of the diplomatic action of Poles with torn between the partitioners of Polish lands. Even though, like the Polish political options – pro-Russian Roman Dmowski and the pro-Austrian option associated with Józef Piłsudski and his legions, there were also divisions in the *Regat* for supporters of the Entente and Central States. On the other hand, the fact that both Romanians and Poles were shooting their compatriots while fighting in the uniforms of hostile armies no longer raises doubts.

There is no doubt that the objectively necessary integration (and therefore the administrative and legal unification) of the merged Polish lands and the lands attached to the “old” Romania wasn’t easy. Of course, in the case of Poland it was impossible to rebuild the state with the entire area of the Russian, which until 1795 covered 462 000 km². From 1815 after the Congress of Vienna, as the Polish Kingdom it covered 127 320 km² (the largest cities: Warsaw, Łódź, Lublin, Częstochowa), in which Poles made up 72.2 % (1913). The rest of the lands taken (major cities: Białystok, Vilnius, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Minsk, Zhytomyr) were incorporated directly into Russia, where Poles accounted for 9.3% (1909), although these official figures seem to be very undervalued. Prussian occupation until 1795 covered 141 000 km², after 1815 its part (about 29 000 km²) was established by the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Wielkopolska/Great Poland with cities Poznań, Bydgoszcz and Kujawy region), where the Polish-speaking population was 61.5% (1910). The rest of the partition, as Gdańsk/Danzig Pomerania, where the Polish-speaking population accounted for 35.5%, and Warmia region with city of Olsztyn were incorporated directly into Prussia. In Warmia and Mazury/*Masuria* regions, the Polish-speaking population accounted for 28.5% of the total population¹. The Austrian occupation as region Galicia

¹ Until the mid-13th century, Warmia and *Masuria* were in the hands of the Balto-Slavic tribes of Prussians and then of the German Teutonic Order. In the years 1466-1772 Warmia belonged to Poland but *Masuria* belongs only from 1945.

until 1795 covered 130 000 km², and after 1815 there remained 78 500 km² of the area: Western Małopolska/Little Poland/Galicia with the city Cracow and Eastern Małopolska/Little Poland/Galicia with the city of Lviv. The rest of the Austrian Partition was incorporated into Russia. In Galicia, the Polish-speaking population accounted for 58.6%, of which in Western Galicia 96.1% and in Eastern Galicia 39.8% (HPL 1994, 68-119)². In total, before 1914 about 20 million Poles lived in these three partitions (Roszkowski 1991, 8).

In addition, Polish people in 1918 aspired to lands, which Poland before the partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) did not have, because they either dropped out earlier or never belonged to it, and for which the Polish political elite – like Romanians in relation to their postulated lands – they provided historical, ethnographic or economic arguments. It was mainly about the greater part of the German (Prussian) Upper Silesia, where in 1910 53% of the Polish-speaking population lived; scraps of Western Pomerania; southern parts of German East Prussia (*Masuria*); Austrian Cieszyn/Teschén Silesia with 54.9% of the Polish-speaking population (HPL 1994, 95; Wanatowicz 1992; Achremczyk 1997, 214-227; Malczewska-Pawelec 2012, 435-444; Gruchała, Nowak 2013, 113-118; Kaczmarek 2015, 65). The Polish-speaking population, but mostly without the Polish national consciousness (more than 100 000), also lived in sections of Hungarian (until 1918) northern Slovakia: Orava and Spisz (Roszkowski 2011, 11-16)³.

Independent since 1878 Romania, 1881 as the Kingdom of Romania, at the outbreak of WW I consisted of 137 903 km², where lived a population of 7 160 680 inhabitants (1912). For Romanian diplomacy, the most important postulated area was Transylvania, belonging to the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the negotiations on the accession of Romania to the war on the side of the Entente in Bucharest

in August 1916 she obtained her permission to join the other provinces from Hungarian part: all Banat area, the lands between Transylvania and the river Tisza, and from the Austrian part: 4/5 of Bucovina area (Batowski 1982, 145-146; Demel 1986, 351; Willaume 2004, 68, 75). In 1910 in Transylvania, the Romanian population was 53.8%, Hungarian 28.6%, German 10.8%. 38.4% of the Romanian population lived in Bukovina, against 38.4% of Ukrainians (*Ruthenen*). In total, over 3 200 000 Romanians (1910) lived in Austro-Hungary. In Russian Bessarabia, the Romanian-speaking Moldovans constituted about 2/3 of the population of this province (Demel 1986, 340, 350; Ungureanu 2003, 268; Skowronek 2018, 36-37).

The majority of inhabitants of free Polish partitions remained from agriculture. In Galicia, it was 73.1% of inhabitants (1910), while in the Kingdom of Poland 56.6% (1897) and in the Prussian partition (Grand Duchy of Poznań and Pomerania) 52.2% in 1907 (HPL 1994, 101-102)⁴. In terms of industrial development, the best situation was in the Russian partition, the worst in Galicia. In the lands which in 1772 did not belong to Poland, the most developed industry (mining and metallurgy) was located in Upper and Cieszyn Silesia (Greiner 2015, 439-450). In the Romanian *Regat*, 80% of the population remained from agriculture. In comparison with the *Regat*, the Transylvanian part of the Hungarian Kingdom was more industrialized, with 70% of the population remained from agriculture. In Russian Bessarabia, 90% of Moldovans were illiterate (Demel 1986, 333, 343, 350; Skowronek 2018, 22-23).

The Poles had the greatest domestic development opportunities in Galicia, which in 1867 gained autonomy, which – in contrast to the Prussian partition – the threat of germanization of the province was liquidated, because the Poles in Galicia were the ruling nation. The strength of Galicia's political and cultural influence on the other partitions, however, was weakened by its economic backwardness and social conflicts. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia (where the Ukrainians made up 58.9%, but in fact they were not equal to Poles) became a bigger problem. In areas that were not part of the partitions, the strongest

² In 1872, the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg determined that in the census there would be a question about language, not nationality, which (in lists 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910) could, but it did not have to mean real nationality.

³ All Silesian lands fell away from Poland in the 14th century. From 1742, most of Silesia was included to Prussia, while in Austria there was only Cieszyn Silesia (together with Opava, part of the so-called Austrian Silesia). Polish peasants came to Upper Hungary from the 16th century. In 1412 Poland obtained from Hungary pledge 13 cities in the Spisz, which Austria occupied in 1769, three years before the first partition.

⁴ In Cieszyn Silesia, 29% (1910) of all employed worked in agriculture and forestry, the same number in Upper Silesia (in 1907).

developed Polish national consciousness was in the Austrian Cieszyn Silesia, the weakest in the Prussian *Masuria*, and in the Hungarian Spisz and Orava (Achremczyk 1997, 227-233; Chojnowski 1997, 17-20; Roszkowski 2011, 48-51; Nowak, Gruchala 2013, 21-164).

For legal reasons, Romanians living in areas outside the *Regat* have never achieved such a political and cultural position as the Poles in Galicia. Romanians in Bukovina had the least problems, which, like in Cieszyn Silesia, was favored by liberal national policy. It was worse in Hungarian part, where the situation of Romanians often reminded the location of Ukrainians in Galicia. That is why the Daco-romanian unification trend showed itself mainly in Transilvania, whereas in the federated local system of Bukovina (from 1910), it had a weaker impact (Chlebowczyk 1983, 313-315; Chlebowczyk 1988, 120; Willaume 2004, 60-61). On the other hand, it should be remembered that from the mid-nineteenth century, national consciousness also developed among Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belarussians, Czechs and Slovaks neighboring with Poles, and among Ukrainians and Serbs neighboring with Romanians, which could be a harbinger of many future complications.

During WW I, the economic situation of Polish lands under occupation significantly deteriorated. In the Kingdom of Poland, most of the industry was destroyed or dismantled and evacuated deep into Russia with a million Polish people. In 1919, the level of industrial production amounted to only 30% of the state from 1913 (Roszkowski 1991, 12-13, 33). On all fronts about 0.5 million Poles were killed. The Romanian Kingdom, plundered by the war and occupiers, lost 0.8 million inhabitants (10%) during war, and in May 1918 (after peace in Bucharest) part of its territory (Dobrogea, Carpathian passes) and control over strategic industries for the Central States. In the Polish and Romanian lands there was unemployment, high prices, and inflation. Only the problem of Bessarabia was settled after Bucharest's thought, which was caused by the collapse of Tsarist Russia (Demel 1986, 354-356).

After the end of the WW I, the integration of the lands inhabited by Poles in a reborn Polish state could be compared with similar processes of unification of postulated Romanian lands with the *Regat*. The starting point for the territorial shape of the reborn Poland was to be - in the conviction

of the majority of Poles - the three partitions and other areas they closed in, which in 1772 were outside the borders: Cieszyn Silesia in Austro-Hungary, Upper Silesia and *Masuria* in East Prussia. In the submitted Entente, in March 1917, the chairman of the Polish National Polish Committee (*Polski Komitet Narodowy*) in exile, Roman Dmowski, proposed that the territory of future Poland would include: Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia from the territory of Austria, the Kingdom of Poland and Governorate of Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno, part of Minsk and Wolyn areas from Russia, and The Grand Duchy of Poznań, Gdańsk Pomerania, the southern part of East Prussia (Warmia and *Masuria*), Upper Silesia from Germany (Dmowski 1988, 221). In the case of Romania, the defeat of the Central States in the Autumn of 1918 put again on the agenda the issue of the postulated areas of the Kingdom of Hungary and the historical part of Moldova - the Austrian (from 1774) Bukovina, not counting the demands of Bulgaria for the peace in Bucharest's southern Dobrogea.

In contrast to the Polish territories, which were covered by three partitions as well as Upper and Cieszyn Silesia, which dropped from Poland in the Middle Ages, postulated by Romanians Transilvania before 1918 was in the past united with other Romanian lands only for less than a year in the time of Michai Viteazul (1599-1600). It seems, however, that in Romania there were no related historical dilemmas, because the region was inhabited mostly by Romanians and it was about a program of unification of the lands they considered Romanian. As in Poland, the famous message of American president Thomas Woodrow Wilson of about the right of nations to self-determination, which in the autumn of 1918 legitimized independence movements in many areas, was commonly referred to. The manifesto of Emperor Charles I of October 16, 1918 announcing the federalization of the monarchy and calling for the creation of "national councils", which were supposed to represent individual nations in contacts with Vienna, was not without significance for the acceleration of unification processes in the lands inhabited by Poles and Romanians. As it turned out, the formation of such bodies instead of saving the monarchy, accelerated its disintegration, because it further legitimized the political activities of the local population, which only seemingly led to a compromise with the Austrian administration, and actually went towards joining the rest of

the mother nation. This was especially the case of Cieszyn Silesia, where, since the beginning of October 1918, the establishment of a Polish national committee, planned to take over from the hands of hostile Germans after the imperial manifesto, has been adopted by the Poles since the beginning of October 1918. Therefore, the Silesian Inter-Party Committee (*Śląski Komitet Międzypartyjny*), whose formation was planned for October 19, could have adopted the name of the National Council of the Cieszyn Duchy (*Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego*), which sounded more representative (Nowak 2015, 15-17). Such a need was not found in the neighboring autonomous Galicia, where the Poles were a ruling nation and formed on October 28 in Cracow, the Polish committee assumed the name of the Polish Liquidation Commission (*Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna*), although in such smaller towns such national councils were established (Roszkowski 1991, 17-18). On October 18-19, the Ukrainian National Council (*Українська Національна Рада*) was established in Lviv with the intention of taking power in Eastern Galicia, which was contrary to the interests of Poles (Chojnowski 1997, 46-47). Committees of this name were also created by ethnically Ukrainian highlanders known as Lemkos, who lived in the Galician Carpathians (Magosci 1993, 95-105). Similarly to the events in Galicia, we can point in the case of Bukovina, where local Romanians used the imperial manifesto to create on October 27 in Chernivtsi – during the National Assembly – Romanian National Council (*Consiliul Național Român*), whose opponent were not Germans, but Ukrainians identifying with the program of the Ukrainian National Council from Lviv, in which plans it was also the incorporation of Bukovina into the future Ukrainian state, or at least its northern part (Jankowski 2007, 200-201, Flondor 2017, 108-109; Anton 2018, 31). Also in the Hungarian, German or Russian territories similar bodies were formed during the weakening of the existing state structures, such as the Council of the Country (*Sfatul Țării*) in Bessarabia, the Romanian National Council in Transylvania or in the case of Poles, the Supreme People's Council (*Naczelną Radą Ludową*) in Poznań in Wielkopolska and many other.

On October 7, 1918, operating from September 1917 under the control of the Germans in the Warsaw occupied by them, the Polish Regency Council (*Rada Regencyjna*) issued a manifesto

announcing the rebuilding of an independent state on the principles of Wilson's message (Roszkowski 1991, 14). The Regency Council, however, was not the equivalent of the Council of the Country in Chisinau, because it operated in other geopolitical and military circumstances, even despite the fact that the Bessarabian organ was dominated by Moldovans.

The rebirth of Poland in the predominantly Polish ethnic area was quite efficient. The fastest Poles took over the lands belonging to Austria, which from mid-October was falling faster and faster. On October 19, the National Council of the Duchy of Cieszyn was established in Cieszyn, which on 30 October proclaimed the region's membership in Poland (Nowak 2015, 17-22). The new Polish administration in Western Galicia organized itself without major problems, where the Poles had previously ruled and had no opponent due to their autonomy. From October 28, the Polish Liquidation Commission, headed by the leader of the peasant's movement in Galicja Wincenty Witos. In the Kingdom of Poland, the German authorities were no longer able to oppose the facts made by Poles. A more complicated situation occurred in the Prussian partition, which remained within the borders of Germany, which, though weakened, did not intend to give up their eastern areas. The Polish interests were represented there on November 10, 1918 by the Supreme People's Council, which tried to take over the initiative in the province Wielkopolska. November 11 stopped fighting on the western front. On the same day, the Regency Council gave command of the newly emerging Polish army arrived to Warsaw from the prison in Magdeburg to Józef Piłsudski, which is now considered a symbolic day of Poland's Independence Day (Roszkowski 1991, 17-19).

Another situation prevailed on the Polish ethnic borderlands. In Eastern Galicia at the beginning of November 1918, the Ukrainians were hoping for their own independent state, which led to the ongoing Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted for many months, which the Ukrainians lost (Chojnowski 1997, 47-53). Apart from the fact that the Polish army, which is still in the process of reconstruction, and that the Romanian army- similarly reconstructed after the capitulation in front of Central States were at that time unable to effectively support its countrymen on the borderland, the situation of Poles in Eastern Galicia can not be a parallel to the situation of Romanians in The

Kingdom of Hungary, because the Poles in Galicia, like the Hungarians in Transylvania and in Banat were a ruling nation. Besides, in Transylvania, apart from Romanians, of course, there were no other nations or nationalities who wanted to fight for full territorial independence in 1918. Such far-reaching ambitions did not have the Transylvanian German Saxons, of course, bypassing their postulates related to autonomy (and, of course, bypassing the unrealistic plans of a part of German Swabes in Banat for independence of this province). On the other hand, even from a “geographical” point of view the situation of Saxons did not resemble the location of the Germans in Upper Silesia, who in the autumn of 1918 mostly did not want to hear about the separation of their region from the German state (Hauser 1999, 9-19). In the case of Transylvanian Romanians, the counterpart of the Romanian National Council established on 31 October, headed by Theodor Mihali, may be the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv. The activity of the Romanian national councils in Transylvania can be also boldly compared with the functioning of similar Polish organs in Cieszyn and Upper Silesia, whose opponents were defending their state of having local Germans. A better situation for the Poles prevailed in Cieszyn Silesia, because Austria was falling apart, worse in Upper Silesia, because the German state, though weakened, still ruled this province (Hauser 1991, 21-22; Nowak 2015, 23-24). However, it should be remembered that the Hungarians, Germans and Bulgarians in 1918 were defeated nations, which of course was good for the Polish and Romanian chances for change. On the other hand, both Poles and Romanians came with new opponents whose territorial demands coincided with those of Poland or Romania: for the Poles they were especially Lithuanians in Vilnius area and Ukrainians in the Eastern Galicia, and Czechs in Cieszyn area; for Romanians – the Ukrainians in Bukovina and Serbs in Banat.

The events of the turn of 1918 and the following months in the border areas of Poland and Romania are also connected with the interesting issue of the local people occupying typical “expectant” attitudes. Some of the residents, regardless of their ethnic affiliation or national identification, were afraid of changing the political situation, lowering the political status of their province, chaos, deterioration of material conditions. There were also groups without national identification,

which were confused in the face of rapid change. In some of the border areas, autonomy was demanded, non-ethnic consensus formed, separatist moods emerged as alternatives. Apart from the autonomist Bolshevik programs, some of these activities were also a tactic aimed at waiting for a difficult and uncertain situation. These phenomena occurred more frequently in areas inhabited by Romanians, especially those in which the existing state structures collapsed or weakened.

This was especially the case in Bessarabia, where, after the Russian February Revolution of 1917, revolutionary moods appeared on the one hand, and on the other, fears of many residents and increasingly weaker Russian authorities against the consequences of such a threat. In the emerging separatist programs of local elites many initiatives were shown by the Romanian-speaking Moldovans who in spring 1917 created the Moldovan National Party (*Partidul Național Moldovenesc*). In November 1917, the Council of the Country (*Sfatul Țării*) was formed, the composition of which was supposed to reflect the national and social situation of the province (84 deputies were Romanian Moldovans, 36 represented other nationalities). In December 1917, the Country Council announced the creation of an autonomous Moldovan Democratic Republic as part of the Russian Federation. At this point, you can ask why the Country Council did not immediately proclaim the connection of Bessarabia to Romania? Firstly, because the moods in the Country Council were not favorable, secondly, Romania was then weakened and defeated by the Central States and did not want to open a new war front. Besides, unlike Transylvania, Bessarabia in Romanian political thought did not yet have an important place at the time, although the Central States saw in Bessarabia a compensation for the Bucharest humiliated by them. But at the end of 1917, the situation in Russia and the Bolshevik threat were more important for Chișinău than the problems of the *Regat*. In this situation, the appropriate national and social composition of the Council of the Country, the announcement of autonomy and declaration of belonging to federated Russia, that is, the state that has not yet been established and the implementation of agricultural reform could be an attempt to temporarily protect the Bessarabian elites against external and internal threats, especially the Bolshevik danger. The events gained further pace when in January 1918 the Bolsheviks occupied Chișinău, forcing

the Council of the Country to evacuate to Iași in Romania, where she asked the Romanian authorities staying there for military intervention. When the Romanian army actually removed the Bolsheviks from Bessarabia, the Council declared the independence of the MDR, and on 27 March / 9 April, most of its deputies, though mainly Moldovans, proclaimed entry into the Kingdom of Romania on federal principles (Rutkowski 2013, 148; Anton 2018, 27-30). Another alternative to avoiding Bolshevik swallowing Russia for Bolshevik politics was not possible at that time.

The attitude of “*wait and see*” but also proof of the existence of different visions of the future, can also determine the actions of Romanian leaders in Transylvania, who until December 1918 balanced between autonomy under the new federated – what they initially hoped – Hungary, proclaiming province independence and direct and unconditional joining Romania. It was also no accident that the famous “Declaration of the Unification” (*Declarația de Unire*) of Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania on December 1, 1918, announced at Alba Julia, talked about the autonomy of the province (Anton 2018, 33-34). More typical tactical activities of the Romanian elite in 1918 can be seen in Bukovina.

Events in Bessarabia can only be partially compared to the situation on the some Polish borderlands. For example in Cieszyn Silesia, where the Austrian administration ceased to exist at the end of October 1918, the conflict between the Poles and the Czechs began immediately, as both parties clearly formulated their territorial demands, which were mutually exclusive. The Polish National Council, composed of representatives of local Polish parties, all options, and soon the authorities in Warsaw, citing President Wilson’s message, wanted to join the reviving Polish state of 2/3 of the region, where the ethnically Polish population dominated, while the Czech equivalent – the County National Council (*Zemský Národní Výbor*) along with the government in Prague made finally an economic argument, claiming that the new Czechoslovak state can not function without Cieszyn coal and running through this region a railway line linking the Czech area with Slovakia. Initially, a compromise was made between the Poles and the Czechs, when on November 5, 1918, the Polish and Czech national councils made a provisional demarcation of the region according to ethnic criteria. The Czechs were not satis-

fied, but in that time were too weak to oppose the Poles. After a few weeks the roles were reversed and, like the Poles before, the Czechs now applied politics of *faits accomplis*. In January 1919, the Czech army attacked the zone ruled by Poles and the Cieszyn problem moved to the forum of the Paris Peace Conference, which ordered the holding of a plebiscite. In the end, it did not happen, and on July 28, 1920, the Council of Ambassadors divided the region according to Prague’s expectations, as a result of which a large Polish national minority remained in Czechoslovakia. Spisz and Orava were also divided. In the period of the ongoing Polish-Czech conflict, the typically waiting attitudes were initially occupied by Cieszyn Germans and their Polish-speaking allies from the Józef Koźdoń movement, among whom there were people who did not identify themselves with the Polish national movement, knowingly or unconsciously recognizing themselves not as Poles but as Silesians who considered Poland as a foreign country and standing on a lower level of civilization. Such groups of people occurred in many borderlands. For this group, the alternative to joining the region to Poland or Czechoslovakia were the separatist plans for the entry of Cieszyn Germans into small *quasi*-states under the leadership of Vienna and German Austria (*Deutschösterreich*), and then the new Austrian Republic, which Germans from the area of Austrian Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia tried to create from October 1918: *Deutschböhmen*, *Deutschmähren*, *Deutschschlesien*, *Sudetenland*, *Deutschsüdmähren*. In 1919 the Germans tried to lobby the Allies for the purpose of handing over their territories under the authority of Berlin or neutralizing them. However, the Entente plans did not include such options (Majewski 2007, 161-176; Nowak 2015, 20-66).

In the other hand, some similarities to developments in Cieszyn Silesia can be found in Bukovina, where after the fall of Austria and after the rejection of provincial autonomy plans under the new Austrian federation, there remained two nations contending for this province: Romanians and Ukrainians who created their regional national representations in Chernivtsi. The Ukrainians were in favor of the division of Bukovina according to the census and joining the part inhabited mostly by them (but with Chernivtsi) to the future Ukrainian state. Initially, they had strong security for their plans in the form of Ukrainian gunner troops, which were then there, but after the out-

break of fighting with the Poles for Lviv, most of them left for Galicia. The Romanians were in favor of joining the whole province to the *Regat*, which they voted on October 27, 1918 at the National Assembly in Chernivtsi, which also announced itself as Romanian Constituent, headed by Iancu Flondor. Only Romanian socialist Aurel Onciul from the Romanian leaders was for the division of Bukovina. A similar gathering was organized by Ukrainians, supporting the division of the region and including the northern part up to the Siret river to Ukrainian state. Due to "geographical" reasons, unlike Cieszyn Silesia, the local Germans did not come up with separatist ideas, but were interested, similarly to other minorities, in the peaceful transfer of power to Ukrainians and Romanians, which on 6 November, the Provincial President Josef Etzdorf did in fact towards their representatives. The communes with the Ukrainian majority were subordinate to the local Ukrainian authorities, communes with the majority of Romanian to the Romanian authorities. Chernivtsi was supposed to be a neutral place under joint management. But at the same time, Romanian leaders made contact with the Romanian army in Iasi in *Regat*, asking for protection from growing chaos, as a result of which on November 11, the Romanian army entered Bukovina, allegedly for order. But it was already known that joining Bukovina to Romania was already an official post of Bucharest in the international arena. However, Romanian-Ukrainian fights took place in places. On November 28, the General Congress of Bukovina, dominated by Romanians, announced an union with the *Regat*. The Ukrainian delegate participating in the meeting protested that the future of the region would be decided by the future Peace Conference. 7 German and 6 Polish delegates voted for Romania. On 6/19 December, the Romanian government issued a decree on the annexation of Bukovina (Буковина 1998, 223-225; Jankowski, 201-204; Hrenciuc 2010, 162-183). The policy of *faits accomplis* was decided.

The stronger separatist movement developed after the WW I on the German (Prussian) Upper Silesia, where in the first phase of its activity we also find opportunities to compare with the situation in Bessarabia or also Banat and Transilvania. What was particularly important was the fact that, unlike Cieszyn Silesia, where, after the fall of Austria, the authorities "lay on the street", the German state, like Russia in 1917, although weak-

ened, still existed. The Germans in Upper Silesia were in a better position than the Germans in the Austrian Silesia, and the Polish national movement and Polish national consciousness were less developed than in Cieszyn Silesia. In addition, due to the economic importance of Upper Silesia, the voice of the Silesian Germans in Berlin counted, regardless of the fact that the majority of Germans in the whole country could not imagine its existence without this region. The motivation to accelerate separatist actions was, like in Bessarabia, an outbreak of revolutionary struggles, this time on the streets of Berlin, from 10 November 1918. In Upper Silesia, slogans demanding autonomy in the German state appeared, which was to prevent internal chaos and the threat of dividing the region or joining its parts to Poland. The representatives of this trend were mainly Germans and some Poles, accused by the Polish national movement Wojciech Korfanty of agreeableness towards the German administration, which at the beginning of the 20th century intensified the Germanisation activities. The leading separatists included: brothers Johann (Jan) and Thomas (Tomasz) Reginek and Ewald Latacz. At the end of November 1918, some of them also planned to declare independence and neutrality of the region in the Upper Silesia Free State (*Freistaat Oberschlesien*). In January 1919, the Upper Silesians Union (*Związek Górnoślązaków – Bund der Oberschlesier*) was established, which demanded equality between German and Polish, the indivisibility of the region and, in the case of such a threat, the creation of a neutral Upper Silesian state. Here, too, the possibility of invoking the Bessarabian example ends, because the German state, unlike Russia, has survived. The authorities in Berlin, which after the loss of Wielkopolska were aware of the Polish threat in Upper Silesia, did not approve the actions of the separatists, unless they acted to the detriment of Poland. Also, Entente was not interested in choosing the "third way", and France wanted to weaken Germany. Therefore, according to the Treaty of Versailles of July 28, 1919 on the future of Upper Silesia was to resolve the plebiscite, that is, contrary to the separatists' hopes, the region was to be divided, because the Allies did not agree to vote also for neutrality (Hauser 1991, 29-99; Nowak 2018, 37-38). Before the vote, which took place on March 20, 1921, the Poles twice attacked the Germans with weapons in their hands in the Silesian Uprisings (17-24 August 1919, 19-26 August 1920). In

the plebiscite, 59.6% of the votes were for Germany, 40.4% for Poland. Another anti-German uprising lasted from May 3 to July 5, 1921. Finally, on October 20, 1921, the Council of Ambassadors granted Poland one-third of the plebiscite area, where, however, the majority of heavy industry in Upper Silesia was located (Masnyk 2015, 294-300). The idea of *Freistaat Oberschlesien* can be more compared to the problem trying to function in late autumn 1918 of the Banat Republic, whose authorities in Timișoara composed of local Germans, Hungarians, Serbs, Jews and Romanians, following similar themes, initially opted for belonging to federated Hungary and then tried, (unsuccessfully) to lobby in Paris to maintain a separate state (Zawistowska 2013, 169).

The most spectacular example of typical tactical actions of Poles connected with territorial changes in their favor may be the final solution by Poland of the problem of Vilnius and Vilnius area, to which the road turned out to be more complicated than Romanian matters. After the fiasco of federal negotiations between Poles and Lithuanians and the withdrawal of the Red Army, on October 7, 1920, after pressure from the Western Powers (implementation of the agreement with Spa, 10 VII 1920), Poland was forced to conclude a truce with Lithuania, leaving Vilnius on the Lithuanian side. In this situation, Józef Piłsudski decided on a *faits accomplis* policy and ordered General Żeligowski's forces to call for artificial rebellion. The "rebellious" Polish forces occupied Vilnius on October 9. Not wanting to annoy the League of Nations, the occupied territories were not immediately incorporated into Poland, but three days later the Poles tactically formed the separatist *quasi*-state "Middle Lithuania" (*Litwa Środkowa*). It was only after another pressure from the League of Nations that the treaty between the independent Lithuania and the capital in Kaunas and Middle Lithuania was signed, which also assumed the holding of a plebiscite. After the truce was concluded, the League of Nations continued its work to lead to a plebiscite in the Vilnius region, which was not due to the lack of will of both sides of the conflict. In February 1922, the "parliament" of Middle Lithuania voted to join the region to Poland. Lithuanian authorities in Kaunas did not recognize this and Polish-Lithuanian relations were not normalized until 1938 (Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, 151-170).

When analyzing the similarities and differences in the period of building and unification by Poles

and Romanians of their countries after WW I, you can also pay attention to the issue of plebiscites, wars and armed uprisings or federal concepts. In contrast to some of the lands that Poland demanded, the lands that Romania joined the plebiscites did not take place, although the Hungarians demanded this, and later the Russians with regard to Bessarabia. In the case of Poland, the plebiscite took place in the German Warmia, *Masuria* and *Powiśle* (11 VII 1920) and in Upper Silesia (20 III 1921), which resulted from the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Other planned plebiscites on the Polish borderlands (Cieszyn Silesia, Spisz, Orava, Vilnius area, Eastern Galicia) did not take place (Chlebowczyk 1988, 533-538). Regarding military matters, it can be stated that in the lands annexed to Romania by the end of 1918, the Romanian troops were more typical of police operations than frontal battles, in which virtually all Polish borderlands abounded until 1920. Not counting the suppression of further Soviet provocations on the borderline of Bessarabia, only from mid-April to August 1919 Romanian troops were conducting regular armed struggles, this time against the Hungarian Republic of Soviets (Willlaume 2004, 93; Șperlea 2018, 84-85). In Romanian postulated lands, Romanian armed uprisings did not break out, while Poles fought in the Wielkopolska Uprising (December 1918 - February 1919) and the Silesian Uprisings (1919, 1920, 1921). In turn, the ideas and federation plans of Romanian political leaders in the lands of the Hungarian Crown and Bessarabia from autumn 1918 can not be equivalent to similar Polish ideas of Józef Piłsudski regarding Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, which assumed political integration of federations of independent states but not the regions within the reformed Austrian and Hungarian state or Russia (Okulewicz 2001, 14-64).

Looking at the map of reborn Poland and united Romania, it is clearly visible that it was Romania not Poland who managed to implement almost all of the assumed territorial demands. More favorable geopolitical conditions, the balance of power at the Peace Conference and diplomatic skills, which the Romanians lacked, were not without significance for such a situation. Romania increased its territory to 295 049 km² (1923) and the population increased to over 15 million. The territory of Poland was 386 273 km² (1928) with over 27 million (1921). To the unrealized demands of Warsaw, the loss of which was especially felt in

Poland was primarily the area inhabited by nationally conscious indigenous Poles in the western part of Cieszyn Silesia behind the river Olza (so-called *Zaolzie*), which fell to Czechoslovakia (Nowak 2015, 66). The loss of Poland in the plebiscite in Upper Silesia was not so painful because Poland received a highly industrialized area from this region. In turn, the defeat of Poland in the plebiscite in Warmia, *Masuria* and *Powiśle* (only 3.4% votes for Poland) resulted from the poor national awareness of Polish-speaking autochthons (Chlebowczyk 1988, 548-550). The same national unconscious population remained in the Czechoslovak parts of Spisz and Orava, where Poland obtained only 27 villages. Outside Poland, has also been postulated Gdańsk (as the "Free City") and over a million Poles in Soviet areas⁵.

Integration of the areas that created the reborn Poland and the united Great Romania did not end, of course, with the signing of peace and border treaties. Both countries were still waiting for hard work. The regions and people who had previously lived in different countries, in various legal and financial systems, as well as at various cultural and civilizational levels were connected. In spite of using the same language, there were differences both between Poles from the former partitioning powers and between Romanians from *Regat* and "new" provinces in the level of life, possibilities of national development, mentality, different level of national consciousness. The expectations of the compatriots attached to the central authorities were also different, especially as the regional divisions were very strong and they are still being felt today. Both countries also had a large number of national minorities (Poland 31.1% in 1931, Romania 28.1% in 1930), and beyond their borders often revisionist neighbors. All this complicated the situation of both countries at the start.

The integration of the territories of both countries was also important for the model of the state, which will be selected by Polish and Romanian authorities – more or less centralized. All the more so because in 1918, both in Polish provinces and in the "new" Romanian provinces, people talked about federations and autonomy, and about the

entry into their new states under certain conditions. In Poland, it was mainly interested in Poles from post-German Upper Silesia, who were aware of interregional differences. Eventually, the Polish authorities, wanting to outdo the German proposals, in July 1920 and thus before the resolution of the border conflict, gave Upper Silesia territorial autonomy (Dąbrowski 1927). It was the only case of the functioning of this type of autonomy in Central Europe at that time, as the Czechoslovak autonomy granted to the Subcarpathian Rus entered into force only in autumn 1938. In turn, in September 1922, the Polish Parliament passed a law on territorial self-government on the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic borderland (language equality, bicameral regional parliament, prohibition of colonization) did not come into force (Ogonowski 2000, 58-61). In *România Mare*, the situation was more complicated, because the political elites of the "new" provinces from the beginning negotiated with the *Regat* on a common federation or autonomy – so reserved in the unification agreement of 27 March/9 April 1918 with Bessarabia and the "Declaration of the Unification" with Transylvania of December 1, 1918, what Initially Bucharest approved. Ultimately, the centralization model of the state won in *Regat*. On November 27 / December 10, 1918 after pressure from the center, the *Sfatul Țării* passed a resolution on self-dissolution and on April 2, 1920, the Romanian government dissolved the Transylvanian Supreme Council and these two provinces integrated with the "old" Kingdom without any legal differences (Anton 2018, 30-31, 34-35). Fears of internal weakening of the state and national minorities and the memory of historical experience have won, and Poland and Romania, like many other European countries, have focused on the construction of nation states with a prevailing ethnic, not a political nation. A stronger centralization course existed in Romania, whose authorities also introduced strict Romanian regulations. In the "new" provinces, the dissatisfaction of both Romanian and other nationalities grew, separatist moods and the solidarist transnational motto "Bessarabia for Bessarabians" and "Bukovina for Bukovinians" appeared⁶. Also in the Polish Upper Silesia, despite the autonomy, similar slogans voices about the problems of the center-region relationship were often heard (Szramek 1934, 47-52).

⁵ Over 100 000 Poles remained in *Zaolzie* in Czechoslovakia, over 780 000 in all provinces of Germany (1925). In Upper Silesia, Poland gained 75% of hard coal mining, 45% of iron processing, 49% of coke production. In X-XI 1938 Poland included *Zaolzie* (824 km²) and 220 km from the Czechoslovak parts of Spisz nad Orava (all these areas came back to Czechoslovakia in 1945).

⁶ More about integration problems of *România Mare*, in Polish opinions, see: Nowak 2009, 99-122. See also: Palade 2010.

In the process of integration of areas reborn after many years of captivity in Poland and united Romania, there were many similarities and differences. Integration problems complicated internal relations, but they did not stop the development and further strengthening of both states. Regardless of the facts presented, it should be remembered that the reconstruction of inde-

pendent Poland and the unification of Romania depended not only on the geopolitical situation, position at the Paris Peace Conference, promises of the Western powers, efficiency of diplomacy, military possibilities, but above all on the strength and will of Poles and Romanians, which legitimized the actions of both countries in the international arena.

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Integrarea Poloniei renăscute și a României unite. Similitudini și diferențe

Cuvinte-cheie: Polonia și România în 1918, integrarea teritorială a Poloniei renăscute și a României unite, federație, autonomie, separatism, problema națională după Primul război mondial.

Rezumat: Deși anul 1918 a marcat începutul mării uniri a României, iar pentru polonezi o renaștere totală a statalității după 123 de ani de sclavie, între aceste procese se găsesc atât diferențe, cât și asemănări. Aceasta se referă, în special, la problemele integrării politice și juridice a teritoriilor poloneze într-un stat și la „noile” provincii românești cu „vechiul” regat. La sfârșitul Primului Război Mondial, în zonele locuite de polonezi și pe terenuri postulate (așezate) de români s-au înființat consiliile naționale independente poloneze și românești. Unii dintre ei au anunțat imediat apartenență ținuturilor lor natale – în special, acest lucru a fost marcat în teritoriile poloneze, iar alții au fost mai precauți și erau în așteptarea schimbărilor – de exemplu, Basarabia și Transilvania. Această situație era cauzată de condiția geopolitică, de teama bolșevicilor și de structura națională complicată din regiune. De asemenea, ei așteptau reformele în Rusia, Austria și Ungaria în privința federației și autonomiei, pentru a prelua experiența. De altă parte, erau mișcările separatiste germane din Silezia de Sus și ale maghiarilor în România, care, în cadrul proiectelor create de cvasi-state au avut șansa de a-și menține pozițiile. Necesitatea de autonomie în rândul locuitorilor din unele regiuni (Basarabia, Transilvania, Silezia Superioară) a fost, de asemenea, rezultatul experienței anterioare a existențelor în țările imperiale (cu un nivel mai înalt de civilizație). Procesul de unire,

economic și mental, a diferitelor regiuni a fost foarte complicat, fapt care este evident până în prezent. Polonia și România, precum și alte țări din Europa Centrală au devenit state naționale, însă, România a fost mai centralizată. A fost un pericol și teama privind descentralizarea minorităților naționale. Au fost disensiuni între centru și regiuni cu privire la modul de gestionare a acestora. Acest lucru se întemeia, uneori, pe sloganuri naționaliste, cum ar fi „Basarabia pentru basarabeni” și „Bucovina pentru bucovineni”. Sloganuri similare au apărut în Silezia de Sus, deși această regiune a fost singura în Polonia care a primit autonomie teritorială.

Интеграция возрожденной Польши и объединенной Румынии.

Сходства и различия

Ключевые слова: Польша и Румыния в 1918 году, территориальная интеграция возрожденной Польши и единой Румынии, федерации, автономия, сепаратизм, национальные проблемы после Первой мировой войны.

Резюме: Хотя 1918 год ознаменовал начало великого объединения Румынии, а для поляков – полного возрождения государственности после 123 лет рабства, между этими процессами можно найти как сходства, так и различия. Это относится в частности к проблемам политической и правовой интеграции польских территорий в одно государство и «новых» румынских провинций в «старое» королевство. В конце Первой мировой войны в районах, населенных поляками, и на землях, постулированных (заселенных) румынами, были созданы независимые польские и румынские национальные советы. Некоторые из них немедленно объявили о принадлежности к своим родным землям (это было особенно заметно на польских территориях), другие были более осторожны и заняли выжидательную позицию (пример Бессарабии и Трансильвании), что было вызвано геополитической ситуацией, страхом перед большевиками, сложной национальной структурой региона. Они также надеялись на реформы в России, Австрии и Венгрии в направлении федерации, а затем на автономию в своих странах. Потребность в автономии у жителей некоторых регионов (Бессарабия, Трансильвания, Верхняя Силезия) также была результатом предыдущего опыта жизни в странах с более высоким уровнем цивилизации. Было нелегко объединить разные в экономическом и ментальном плане регионы, что очевидно и по сей день. Польша и Румыния, а также другие страны Центральной Европы стали национальными государствами, но Румыния была более централизованной. Были опасения по поводу децентрализации и национальных меньшинств. Были споры между центром и регионами о том, как ими управлять, и в провинциях часто звучали лозунги «Бессарабия для бессарабцев» и «Буковина для буковинцев». Подобные лозунги появились в Верхней Силезии, хотя этот регион был единственным в Польше, получившим территориальную автономию.

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